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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-UNION'S UNPROTECTED HARASSING 
ACTIVITIES AS A REFUSAL To BARGAIN IN Goon FAITH-While bargaining for 
a new contract, the union announced that it would engage in a "work-
without-contract" program designed to harass the insurance company em-
ployer into accepting its demands, in the event that no agreement was 
reached prior to the expiration of the existing contract. When that con-
tingency occurred, the program was instituted consisting of such activities 
as refusing to write new business for a period, refusing to do customary 
duties, engaging in "sit-in mornings," soliciting policyholder support against 
the company, and mass demonstrations at the company's home office.1 The 
1 Other harassing activities were refusal, after writing of new business was resumed, 
to comply with company reporting procedures; refusal to participate in sales campaigns; 
reporting late to the office; "doing what comes naturally"; not attending special business 
conferences; picketing and distributing leaflets; soliciting signed policyholders' petitions. 
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union continued to attend bargaining sessions, but it informed its members 
in a directive that" ..• a satisfactory contract will be won in the field and 
not at the bargaining table."2 The company thereupon charged the union 
with a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of section 8 (b) (3) of the 
Taft-Hartley amendment.a The National Labor Relations Board rejected 
the Trial Examiner's recommendation to dismiss and entered a cease and 
desist order against the union.4 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia unanimously refused to enforce the order.5 On certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting.6 Where a union's 
conduct at the bargaining table is in apparent good faith, its concurrent use 
of extrinsic economic weapons to force acceptance of its demands is not 
inconsistent with good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' ln-
terna;tional Union, AFL-CIO, (U.S. 1960) 80 S.Ct. 419. 
The Wagner Act7 imposed upon employers the duty to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of their employees over all labor disputes be-
tween them regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.a 
While the act was silent as to the substance or scope of this duty, a clear 
dichotomy 0£ desiderata soon appeared. On the one hand, the Board and 
the courts early read into the duty a standard of good faith.9 The conven-
tional statement of this standard required the employer to" .•. enter into 
discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a 
basis of agreement .•.. "10 Section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley amendment to 
the act incorporated this judicially-created standard into an explicit statu-
tory command.11 Section 8 (b) (3)12 extended the duty so defined to cover 
unions, the principal motivation being to prevent unions from adopting, as 
it was felt they had often done in the past, a: "take-it-or-leave-it attitude" at 
the bargaining table.13 Judged solely by the good faith standard, the 
union's actions in the principal case may not have met the statutory require-
ment. As the quoted directive to its members clearly shows, the union took 
2 Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, 119 NL.R.B. 768 at 771, n. 7 (1957). 
s 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (b)(3). 
4 Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, note 2 supra. 
5 Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, (D. C. Cir. 1958) 260 F. 
(2d) 736, cert. granted 358 U.S. 944 (1959). The court of appeals, in a one-sentence opin-
ion, unanimously adhered to its holding in Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 
1955) 227 F. (2d) 409, cert. dismissed 352 U.S. 864 (1956), which refused enforcement to a 
Board order, Textile Workers Union, 108 NL.R.B. 743 (1954), based on facts virtually 
identical with those in the principal case. 
6 The dissenting justices (Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker) would have remanded 
the case and required the Board to consider unprotected harassing activities as evidence 
of bad faith. 
7 The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
s 49 Stat. 453 (1935) §8 (5). Now, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (a) (5). 
9 iee note, 61 HARV. L. R.EV. 1224 (1948). See also Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty 
to Bargain' Concept in American Law," 39 MICH. L. R.EV. 1065 (1941). 
10 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 91 at 94. 
11 The Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (d). 
12 Note 3 supra. 
13 See 93 CoNG. REc. 4135 (1947) and 93 CoNG. REc. 5005 (1947). 
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an adamant positiont4 and then sought to win its acceptance, not at the 
bargaining table, but rather by a campaign of unprotected,111 outside 
harassing activities. The fact that the union continued to go through the 
motions of bargaining is not controlling, for the very purpose of the good 
faith standard is to distinguish between a sincere desire to bargain and a 
mere sham.ta In short, it could have been held here that the union openly 
adopted the very "take-it-or-leave-it attitude" that the good faith require-
ment was enacted to prevent. 
The other branch of the dichotomy is implicit in the fact that Congress, 
in imposing the duty to bargain collectively, did not intend to dictate the 
means by which it was to be carried out or to permit any governmental in-
tervention as to the substance of the ultimate agreement.17 As one drafts-
man put it, the act led the parties to the door of the bargaining room but 
did not enter with them.ts This legislative philosophy was made explicit in 
section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which qualified the duty to bargain 
in good faith by stating, " ... but such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ...• "10 
Measured solely by this standard, the Court's holding that the union's 
harassing activities were not inconsistent with the duty to bargain is quite 
correct. Ultimately, any collective bargaining situation is resolved on the 
basis of the relative positions of economic power of the combatants. The 
union's ability to subject its opponent to economic harassment is a lawful 
(albeit unprotected) and valuable addition to its bargaining arsenal. In-
herent in the power that the Board felt it had, under the act, to deprive a 
party of a lawful bargaining weapon is the power to dictate the course or 
manner of the negotiations. This power could also include the compelling 
of a concession or agreement which the party might not have had to make if 
its bargaining position had not been weakened by governmental interven-
tion.20 
The principal case thus presents an anomalous situation in which the 
Board and the Court reach diametrically opposed results on the same facts, 
each result being fully consistent with one of two congressional commands 
14 See note 21 infra. 
llS Section 7 of the Wagner Act declares the right of employees to engage in certain 
"concerted activities." Section 8 of the same act protects this right by making it an unfair 
labor practice for an employer to interfere with these concerted activities in certain ways. 
Thus an "unprotected" activity is one with which an employer may interfere without 
committing an unfair labor practice. If the union's actions here were held to be "pro-
tected," a cease-and-desist order could probably not have issued notwithstanding any find-
ing of a refusal to bargain. However, the Court conceded, arguendo, that the actions were 
not so "protected," citing Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). 
16 E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (9th Cir_ 1943) 133 F. (2d) 676. See also 
Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1401 at 1413 (1958). 
17 See S. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1947). See also Senator Wagner's remarks 
at 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935). 
18 Senator Walsh, at 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935). 
10 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (d). 
20 See Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1401 at 1530 (1958). 
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contained in the same section of the same act. The Court sought to avoid 
the self-contradiction of section 8 (d) by reading the limiting language as 
an express modification of the earlier command. Superficially, the section 
is so written. The difficulty is that the act's legislative history shows that 
Congress simply saw no inconsistency between the limitations of section 8 (d) 
and the judicially-formulated good faith standard which they also enacted.21 
If the duty to bargain in good faith is to have any meaning, it must require 
that agreement be reached through an orderly bargaining process between 
two parties having a sincere desire to reach an agreement in this manner 
rather than by the more primitive means of trial by combat which the act 
purports to supplant. Yet the limitations in section 8 (d), as illustrated in 
the majority opinion, indicate that the agreement can be effected through 
these primitive means so long as the parties effect the facade of sitting across 
a bargaining table while the battle rages elsewhere. The Court, faced with 
a case requiring decision, was forced to choose between the conflicting 
desiderata. In so doing, it has qualified one part of the act to conform to 
another, with the effect of stripping the process of collective bargaining, 
which the act made the fundamental element of our labor relations law, 
of much of its substance. This result is, of course, not effected merely by 
authorizing harassing tactics during bargaining, but rather by the logical 
results of a conclusion that the act requires no more than the formality of 
going through the prescribed ritual at a bargaining table. The Court's 
choice, however, appears to have been correct. For the alternative is to hold 
that the government has the power, under the act, to regulate the bargaining 
process and indirectly to affect the substance of the ensuing agreement, 
which would be an even more drastic result than the emasculation of the 
duty to bargain. It is apparent that the ultimate choice between these two 
far-reaching alternatives is a basic congressional policy decision which goes 
to the heart of our whole statutory labor relations scheme. As Congress is 
seemingly unaware that a choice need be made, it is regrettable that the 
Court treated the act's fundamental inconsistency as merely a resolvable 
"tension.''22 Until Congress is made aware of the fact that it has enacted 
two entirely inconsistent commands, it can hardly make the urgently needed 
decision as to which of these our labor law is to follow. 
William Y. Webb 
21 Senator Pepper's statement at 93 CoNG. REc. 4363 (1947) illustrates this unaware-
ness: ". • • I think we are coming to an awareness of the fact that when a party to a 
dispute merely takes an adamant position, •.• and says 'take it or leave it', that is not 
collective bargaining. • • ." After this endorsement of the traditional good faith standard, 
he continued, " ... labor organizations [have] the right ... to use the economic power 
that they have ••. to better themselves in their relations with their employer .... " This 
statement thus seems to foreshadow the limitations implicit in §8 (d) as the majority 
interpreted that section in the principal case. Congress did feel that the Board had gone 
"very far" into substantive matters through the good faith concept, but this was seen as a 
misapplication of the standard. H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 19, 20 (1947). 
22 See principal case at 425. 
